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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In her opening brief, Appellant Charlynda Goggin (hereinafter Appellant
and/or Charlynda) argued that there was insufficient evidence to support any of
the verdicts and that judgments of acquittal should have been entered on all four
counts, or, in the alternative, that the court should have granted a new trial on the
substantive counts as well as the conspiracy counts. Appellant stands on her
opening brief for these issues.
In its cross appeal, the state raises for the first time the issue of whether
the district court's order granting new trial on the two conspiracy counts should
be reversed because intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy in
Idaho. Appellant asserts that this issue should not be considered because the
state did not raise this issue below. In any event, Appellant asserts that the state
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling, and the
order granting new trial should be affirmed.
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ISSUE
The state characterizes the issue in the cross appeal as follows:
Should the district court's order granting a new trial be reversed because
intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy in Idaho?

The Appellant rephrases the issue as:
Has the state failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
granting a motion for new trial on the conspiracy counts?
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ARGUMENT

THE STATE HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE
CONSPIRACY COUNTS

A.

Standard of review
As explained in State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62 (Ct. App. 2005):
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a
matter of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the
standard that the trial court applies when considering a motion for a
new trial, directing that "the court ... may grant a new trial to the
defendant if required in the interest of justice." Whether the
interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be
disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. In this case, the
new trial motion turned upon the propriety of a jury instruction, a
matter on which this Court exercises free review. If the instructions
taken as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately present
the issues, state the applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or
prejudice a party, then there is no reversible error.

Id., p. 64 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

The familiar test for abuse of discretion is as described in Straub v. Smith,
145 Idaho 65 (2007):
Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks
whether the district court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise
of reason."
Id. p. 71 (internal citations omitted).
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B.

The state failed to preserve its argument

On appeal, the state argues that the intent to violate the law is not an
element of conspiracy in Idaho. However, the state did not argue this below.
Rather, in the State's Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For A
New Trial (hereinafter State's Memorandum) filed in the district court, the state
argued that the jury instructions were correct and that it had proven the
necessary intent. (R. p. 965-966.)
For example, the state argued:
From the State's perspective, there was no evidence presented that
the Defendants' did not know that they were involved in the
manufacture, distribution and/or possession with intent to deliver, a
controlled substance, to wit: a synthetic cannabinoids.
State's Memorandum at p. 4 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 965.)
It is now well established that the appellate court will not consider errors
raised for the first time on appeal unless they constitute fundamental error. State
V.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-225, 245 P.3d 961, 976-977 (2010).

However, the

fundamental error exception applies only to a defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights, which of course cannot apply here to the state of Idaho in its cross appeal.
Accordingly, since the state failed to preserve the issue it now raises in its
cross appeal, this Court should not consider the newly raised issue and should
simply affirm the district court's order granting new trial on the conspiracy counts.
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C.

The district court did not err in granting the motion for new trial
While Charlynda asserts that this Court should not even reach the merits

of the new trial issue, in the event that it does, she asserts that this Court should
nevertheless affirm the order granting new trial on the conspiracy counts. This is
because the district court's ruling was correct and in any event certainly did not
constitute a manifest abuse of discretion.
As the state describes in its brief, Charlynda was charged under the
general conspiracy statute as well as under the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act:
The state charged Goggin under both the general conspiracy
statute, I.C. § 18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p. 490.) Pursuant
to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal conspiracy is defined as
follows:
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of
Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to
effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall
be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to
the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of
Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each
combined to commit.
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
similarly provides:
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said
persons shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or
both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the conspiracy.
I.C. § 37 -2732(f).

5

Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty
of conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an
illegal act and at least one of the conspirators does some act in
furtherance of the illegal objective.
Respondent's brief at p. 12 (footnote omitted).
The state is incorrect in its conclusion. The plain language of the statutes
requires a defendant to enter into an agreement with another to commit a crime
or offense. The statutes do not provide merely that a defendant agree to commit
an act which happens to be illegal, rather, the statutes require that the defendant
enter into an agreement to commit an act which he or she knows is illegal. In
short, the specific use of the terms offense or crime, rather than act, shows that
the statute requires the defendant to understand that the act that is being agreed
upon is actually a crime.
The state cites to State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684 (Ct.App. 2008), a
conspiracy to traffic case, to try and make its point, but the full relevant passage
is as follows:
Negating the specific intent element amounts to fundamental error.
A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that
the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a
specific intent requirement refers to the state of mind which in part
defines the crime and is an element thereof. State v. Fox, 124
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181,183 (1993). In other words, specific
intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of
that act with the intent to cause the proscribed result. While an
Idaho court has not explicitly held as much, it is generally accepted
that conspiracy is a specific intent crime that requires the intent to
agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the
object of the conspiracy. See 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 112 (June
2008). In contrast, instructions given by the court in this case-defining both "intent" and "willfu/ly"--described general intent (the
intent to commit an act, not the intent to commit a crime) which,
read in concert with the instructions setting out the elements of
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conspiracy, implied that Rolon needed only to have general, rather
than specific intent (a higher standard) to be found guilty.
Id. p. 691 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

In short, while it does not reach our specific question, Rolon nevertheless
shows that it is the agreement to commit a crime, and not just an agreement to
perform an act which mayor may not be a crime, which is criminalized by the
crime of conspiracy.

Since a conspiracy conviction does not require that the

substantive offense actually be committed, it makes perfect sense that a higher
standard of intent is required to commit the crime. In other words, requiring the
defendant to actually agree that a crime should be committed, as opposed to
merely agreeing that an act be performed which just so happens to be a crime,
prevents the conviction of a person who neither committed a substantive offense
nor agreed that the law should be broken.
Requiring the defendant to intend that a crime be committed also makes
sense when policy reasons are considered. While there is ample reason to
provide safeguards against convicting persons who did not commit a substantive
offense nor agreed to commit a crime, there is no valid reason to convict persons
who did neither.
The state also cites to United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671,95 S.Ct. 1255
(1975), but this case does nothing to change our analysis. There, defendants
who had assaulted undercover narcotics agents were convicted of assaulting
federal officers and for conspiring to do so. The Supreme Court held that since
the statute was designed to protect federal officers and to insure a federal forum
for prosecution of attacks upon federal officers, the statute did not require the
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assailant be aware that his victim was a federal officer. Thus, in a prosecution for
conspiracy to assault a federal officer, the government was not required to show
that the defendant was aware that the intended victim was a federal officer and
that the assault would violate federal law.
Of course, in an assault case (and conspiracy to assault), the defendant
knows that any assault is unlawful and/or that he is agreeing that an unlawful
assault take place. Thus, the defendant in that case is not agreeing to something
that he does not know is illegal, the assault is obviously illegal, all that is
unknown is the proper court that will hear the case and the possible penalty. In
other words, the federal nature of the officer is only a jurisdictional requirement,
without it the defendant has still conspired to violate state law.
Finally, regardless of this Court's ultimate decision on our question, the
state has still failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion. The test
is not whether this Court would decide this question of first impression differently
from the district court. Rather, the test is whether there was a manifest abuse of
discretion by the district court.
Here, the district court clearly understood that the decision to grant or
deny a new trial was within its discretion. (R. p. 1009.)

The district court also

acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards. Since this was an issue of first impression in Idaho, the district court
analyzed the matter using both Idaho law and the law of other jurisdictions which
had considered the issue. (R. p. 1011-1015.) The court reached its decision by
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an exercise of reason, granting the motion for new trial on the counts it believed
were appropriate (the conspiracy counts) and denying it for the rest.
Given all of this, the state has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
As set forth in her opening brief, Charlynda requests this Court reverse the
district court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, or, in
the alternative, remand this matter for a new trial on all the counts, including the
delivery counts.
Further as to the cross appeal, Charlynda requests that this Court affirm
the district court's order granting the motion for new trial and grant the state no
relief.
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